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NEGLIGENCE-MENTAL HEALTH: WHY IS IT MY
FAULT WHEN I'M THE ONE WHO'S DEAD?:
NORTH DAKOTA COMPARATIVE FAULT IN A SUICIDE
VICTIM/CAREGIVER CONTEXT
Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
On January 25, 1989, Ricky Champagne, an 18-year-old Native
American, was admitted to Indian Health Services (IHS) in Belcourt,
North Dakota, following his attempt to commit suicide via an overdose
of prescription and non-prescription medication. 1 Dr. James Blain pro-
vided medical care at IHS.2 Dr. Blain referred Ricky to the IHS Mental
Health Unit for treatment and wrote an order requesting a staff member
to meet with Ricky immediately. 3 Despite the order, no one from the
mental health unit saw Ricky until the following day. 4
IHS then assigned Ricky's case to Lance Azure, a social services rep-
resentative in the mental health unit.5 Azure met with Ricky on January
26 for approximately one to two hours. 6 On January 27, Dr. Blain or-
dered that Ricky be discharged from IHS, pending the approval of a
member of the mental health unit staff.7 Azure approved, and Ricky was
1. Champagne v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.N.D. 1992). Ricky was the son of
Richard and Debbie Champagne. Id. Ricky had a fraternal twin, Nicky, a younger sister. Vicky, and
a younger brother Joe. id. Ricky was not close to his twin brother as they did not share the same
interests. Id. Specifically, Nicky enjoyed working on cars while Ricky liked cooking and cleaning
indoors. Id. Ricky's interests created tension between Ricky and his family, especially with his father
who would call him a "queer" or a "faggot." Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686. About November of
1988, Ricky had a fight with his father, the reasons for which are unclear. Id. Consequently, Ricky
left home, and stayed with various relatives. Id.
2. United States' Trial Brief at 2, Champagne v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.D. 1992)
(No. A2-90-51) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant]. Dr. Blain was a staff doctor at IHS. Id.
3. Brief for Appellants at 6, Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994) (No.
930215) [hereinafter Appellants' Supreme Court Brief]. IHS is the only agency providing physical
and mental health care on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Id. at 14.
4. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686. IHS did not offer a reason for the delay.
5. Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 2, Champagne v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.D. 1992) (No.
A2-90-51) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Trial Brief].
6. Champagne v. United States, 513 N.w.2d 75, 77 (N.D. 1994). Experts examining Ricky's
case concluded that Ricky had a type of "adolescent adjustment disorder." which may have resulted in
his suicide attempt. Id. However, the experts determined that there was a possibility Ricky was
suffering from major depression. Id. The federal district court found that the poor relationship
between Ricky and his father, exemplified by instances of force and intimidation, likely contributed to
Ricky's unhappiness. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686. Regardless, it is apparent that Ricky was
suffering from a diminished capacity to care for himself. Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 7,
Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1994) (Appeal No. 92-3321NDF) [hereinafter
Supplemental Brief].
7. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686. Dr. Blain was the staff doctor at IHS. Brief for Defendant,
supra note 2. After treating Ricky upon his arrival at IHS for the drug overdose on January 25, Blain
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discharged from the hospital on January 27, 1989.8 Following Ricky's
discharge, IHS did not schedule or provide any counseling for Ricky or
refer him for psychiatric evaluation. 9 Ricky returned home and resumed
classes at school in Belcourt.10
On February 13, 1989, Debra Champagne, Ricky's mother, sched-
uled a meeting with Azure and told him that her son had quit school,
moved out of the family home, and had begun to give away some of his
possessions."l Azure made one attempt to contact Ricky, but did not
reach him.12 Ricky called Azure on February 16, 1989, to make an
appointment to see him the next day.1 3  Ricky did not keep the
appointment and Azure made no further attempt to contact him or to
determine if Ricky was suicidal.14 Ricky killed himself on February 20,
1989.15
The Champagnes filed an administrative claiml 6 with the Aberdeen
Indian Health Service for the death of their son.1 7 After the Department
referred Ricky to Azure for a mental health follow-up exam concerning Ricky's suicide attempt. Id.
The mental health unit had no psychiatrist on staff, but did have on-the-job trained counselors, such as
Azure. Id. Azure did not have a college degree or any extensive formal training in counseling. Id.
Azure had been with the IHS mental health unit for about 17 years prior to Ricky's suicide attempt.
Id. at 2-3.
8. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686.
9. Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, supra note 5, at 2. A consulting psychologist, Dr. Simhia, was at the
Belcourt IHS Hospital three times between Ricky's suicide attempt and his death, but was not asked to
review the case. Id. Debra Champagne, Ricky's mother, claimed that Azure made a specific
agreement to counsel Ricky on a weekly basis. Brief for Defendant, supra note 2. at 3. Azure.
however, denied Mrs. Champagne's claims. Id.
10. Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 3. Ricky's parents could have involuntarily committed
Ricky through a tribal court process. Id. Ricky's mother, however, did not want to do that and Azure
did not feel it was necessary. id.
11. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 77. Friends at school also noted that Ricky was depressed and
withdrawn and began to skip many of his classes. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 686.
12. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 77. Azure went to Ricky's grandmother's house where he was
staying and left a note. Id. Azure made no further attempts to contact Ricky. Id.
13. Id. at 77-78. Ricky called and when asked by Azure if he would like to make an appointment
for counseling, Ricky said yes. Id.
14. Id. at 78. At this point, Ricky had not received any counseling. Id.
15. Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 4. Ricky shot himself in the heart and died. Id.
16. Brief for the Appellee at 8. Champagne v. United States. 40 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1994) (92-
3321) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]. To file an administrative claim against the United States, one
must comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) which provides as follows:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money
damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the
claim to the appropriate federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by
the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988).
When bringing a lawsuit against a federal agency, claimants are required to "exhaust" all
possible remedies within the agency before bringing the matter to court. Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct.
1213, 1220 (1993). By first filing their claim with the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Champagnes had fulfilled the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and now, not satisfied
with the result, were free to take their claim to court. See Id.
17. Appellee's Brief, supra note 16, at 8.
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of Health and Human Services denied the Champagnes' administrative
claim, the Champagnes filed suit against the government pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act,18 alleging medical malpractice and wrongful
death.19
Following a two-day bench trial, the federal district court concluded
that IHS had failed to meet accepted standards of care 20 in its treatment
of Ricky Champagne and that IHS's negligence was a proximate cause
21
of Ricky's death because it was "more likely than not" that Ricky's
suicide could have been prevented with appropriate intervention. 22 Not-
withstanding its findings, the federal court ruled that North Dakota's
comparative fault law barred the Champagnes' recovery because Ricky's
own fault was imputed to his parents and was more than fifty percent of
the total fault for his death.23 The Champagnes appealed to the United
18. Id. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 - 2675], the
district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for ... personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). Since the alleged negligent treatment of Ricky occurred in Belcourt.
North Dakota, the law of North Dakota governed.
19. Appellee's Brief. supra note 16, at 8. In a wrongful death claim, the survivors are only
allowed to bring an action that could have been brought by the deceased for his injuries had he or she
lived; thus the survivors' claim would be barred if the deceased's claim would have been barred. W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984). In their
complaint, the Champagnes sought $750,000 in damages for the loss of Ricky's companionship and for
their emotional distress. Appellee's Brief, supra note 16, at 8.
20. Champagne v. United States. 836 F. Supp. 684, 685 (D.N.D. 1992). The accepted standard of
care for medical malpractice actions in North Dakota was set out in Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d
579. 583 (N.D. 1979). In North Dakota, as in most states, healthcare givers are expected to provide
the same level of care as that which would be supplied in locations of the same size and situation
located anywhere in the United States. See id. at 583-84 (stating that physicians must use that skill and
care as used by other physicians in "similar locations in the same general line of practice.") (footnote
omitted). This includes a duty to furnish a patient the care, attention, and protection reasonably
required by the patient's mental and physical condition. N.D. CiV. JURY INSTR. § 520 (1994). The
accepted standard of care requires a detailed and structured follow-up plan for a patient who has
attempted suicide. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 688. At a minimum, the plan should have included
family counseling sessions, a contact person for Ricky, scheduled counseling appointments, and a
follow-up appointment for Ricky with a physician concerning the state of his mental health. Id.
Instead. Ricky was left to schedule his own counseling sessions and bear the responsibility for his own
follow-up care. Id. The court found that IHS's plan did not meet accepted standards of care. Id. See
also infra notes 70-71 (discussing the duty of care for a medical specialist and a hospital).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the proximate cause of an injury as
the natural and primary act which produces that injury and without which the accident could not have
happened, provided that the injury might be reasonably anticipated).
22. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 688. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 44. at 303 (stating
that "[ilf the intervening cause is one which ... is reasonably to be anticipated. or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligent .... because of failing to guard against it: or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason").
23. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 689. After having considered the percentage of fault
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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 24 Following oral argu-
ments, the Eighth Circuit certified two questions of law to the North
Dakota Supreme Court.25
In answering the certified questions from the Eighth Circuit, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that: (1) North Dakota's comparative
fault statutes require that the fault of a suicide victim in taking his own
life be considered, and (2) the fault of a suicide victim is attributable to
the parents suing as personal representatives of the suicide victim's
estate .26
This Comment will analyze the North Dakota Supreme Court's
opinion, including the court's rationale for the use of comparative fault
in a suicide context, which barred recovery for the Champagnes in their
wrongful death claim. This Comment will also address the importance
of determining a suicide victim's capacity for self-care and how failure
to make that determination may cause potential problems for North
Dakota, should its courts continue to use comparative fault analysis in
the suicide victim/caregiver context.
attributable to IHS and the percentage of fault attributable to the unhealthy father/son relationship, the
court found that IHS's fault did not approach 50 percent of the total fault that contributed to Ricky's
death. Id. Because the statutory framework of section 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
requires that all fault, including intentional acts, must be considered, the federal district court
determined that "Ricky bears the ultimate and primary responsibility for his own death." Id. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995) (containing North Dakota's comparative fault statute).
The federal district court concluded that because Ricky chose to take his own life, responsibility for
his suicide must lie with him, not with IHS. even though IHS staff failed to treat him properly.
Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 690. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (stating that willful conduct
is a factor which can be considered in imputing fault). See also Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168, 172
(Kan. 1988) (stating that in a medical malpractice action, the jury need not determine damages if the
patient is found to be 50% or more at fault).
24. See supra note 16 (explaining that because the Champagnes followed the proper procedures
and "exhausted" their administrative remedies, they could now bring their case before a federal
court).
25. Appellants' Supreme Court Brief, supra note 3, at 20. Pursuant to Rule 47(a) of the North
Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, questions of first instance may go before that state's supreme
court for determination if there is no controlling precedent in the state. N.D. R. APp. P. 47(a). North
Dakota had never addressed the issue of whether an act of suicide can be considered comparative
fault in a medical negligence case. Appellants' Supreme Court Brief, supra note 3, at 17-18.
Therefore, the two certified questions were:
(1) Is a suicide victim's fault to be considered under North Dakota's comparative fault
statutes, § 32-03.2-01 and -02; and
(2) Is any fault of the suicide victim attributable to the plaintiffs Debra Champagne and
Richard Champagne who are the parents and surviving heirs of the suicide victim and
institute this action as personal representatives of the estate of their deceased son.
Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 76 (N.D. 1994).
26. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 76-77.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE MOVE FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE TO COMPARATIVE
FAULT
Prior to 1987, North Dakota's comparative negligence statute per-
mitted recovery only if a plaintiff's negligence was not "as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery was sought." 27 In
1987, the North Dakota Legislature revised the statutes concerning tort
liability to replace traditional tort doctrines such as "negligence" with
an all-inclusive concept of "fault."28 Willful conduct, not included in
the earlier negligence doctrine, was now included in the new fault
doctrine. 29  North Dakota law currently allows recovery if the
contributory fault of the plaintiff is not "as great as the combined fault
of all persons who contribute to the injury." 30 The practical result of
27. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 689. The North Dakota statute previously provided:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1973).
28. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 79. The North Dakota statute provides:
"[F]ault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
towards the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to tort
liability or dram shop liability. The term also includes ... failure to exercise reasonable
care to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation
apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective July 8, 1987).
Under contributory fault, even though a defendant may have violated his or her duty or was
negligent, a plaintiff will not be allowed to recover if his or her own conduct "falls below the standard
to which he [or she] is required to conform for his [or her] own protection." KEETON ET. AL., supra
note 19, § 65, at 451-52.
29. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 79. The North Dakota statute provides:
Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an action by any person to recover damag-
es . . . unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all other persons who
contributed to the injury, but any damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to
the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person recovering ... [u]nder this sec-
tion, fault includes negligence, malpractice, absolute liability, dram shop liability, fail-
ure to warn, reckless or willful conduct, assumption of risk, misuse of product, failure to
avoid injury, and product liability, including product liability involving negligence or strict
liability or breach of warranty for product defect.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective July 8, 1987) (emphasis added).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995). In Erickson v. Schwann, children of a worker
who was run over by a truck during grain loading procedures brought wrongful death actions against
the employer and the truck driver. Erickson v. Schwann, 453 N.W.2d 765, 767 (N.D. 1990). The
supreme court affirmed the district court dismissal of the action after the jury apportioned negligence
at 90% to the deceased and 10% to the truck driver. Id. at 767-69. The court ruled the evidence was
insufficient to support instruction on momentary forgetfulness and the deceased was responsible, or at
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this change in law is that willful acts will now be included, and compared,
when determining the fault (i.e. liability) of each party.3 1
B. NEW AREA OF LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA -COMPARATIVE FAULT OF
SUICIDE VICTIM
Under a comparative fault analysis, a medical provider treating a pa-
tient with suicidal ideations presents a uniquely complex situation. 32 Be-
cause the act of suicide evidences that the course of treatment has failed,
there are difficulties in comparing the effects of a mental illness to the
reasonableness of the medical treatment. 33 The North Dakota Supreme
Court had not previously addressed the comparative fault of a suicide vic-
tim prior to this case. 34 Accordingly, the Court looked to precedents set
by other states, as well as its own comparative negligence decisions.
Several states have addressed the issue of comparative fault in the
suicide victim/caregiver context declaring, as a matter of law, that the pa-
tient could not be at fault because he or she had insufficient capacity to
be responsible for his or her own well-being. 35 For example, the
fault, for his own death, therefore no recovery was allowed. Id. at 769. Furthermore, the 49%
modified comparison form in the 1973 act was retained in the 1987 statute. See generally Mark
Richard Hanson, Comment, Negligence-The Unit Rule and North Dakota's Comparative Negligence
Statute, 64 N.D. L. REV. 135 (1988) (discussing joint and several liability under North Dakota's 1987
comparative fault statute). Other states with comparative fault statutes similar to North Dakota's
include: ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1994); CAL. CIv. CODE §
1714 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.81 (Supp. 1995); INO. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1987);
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.040 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); and WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1988).
31. See Bekis v. Schilling, 357 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that a modified
comparative fault system comprises liability and contribution). In Kavadas v. Lorenzen, the North
Dakota Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the legislative reforms of § 32-03.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code in 1987 was to clarify and improve the method of determining and fixing
responsibility and payment for damages and to increase the availability of liability insurance in terms
of a reduced cost. Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 218, 223 (N.D. 1989).
32. Peoples Bank of Bloomington v. Damera, 581 N.E.2d 426, 429 (11. App. Ct. 1991), cert.
denied, 587 N.E.2d. 1024 (Ill. 1992). The critical distinction between a case in which a patient has
committed suicide and all other medical malpractice cases is that in suicide cases, the patient does not
share the goal of his physician of getting better. Id. While the doctor is working to assist the patient to
suppress suicidal tendencies, the patient, by nature of his illness, may be working at cross-purposes to
his doctor's suggestions and may not be interested in following instructions designed to enable him or
her to safely take prescribed medicine. Id.
33. Id.
34. The North Dakota Supreme Court has, however, addressed the issue of comparative negli-
gence of a suicide victim. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Falkenstein v. City of
Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1987)).
35. See. e.g., Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. 1990); Cowan v. Doering,




Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation36 that a
patient who committed suicide could not be held responsible for the
breach of a duty to exercise care for his own well-being since the
hospital had assumed that duty. 37 This theory is called a "capacity-
based" comparative standard. 38
A similar result was reached in 1988 in a New Jersey case, Cowan v.
Doering,39 which involved permanent injuries resulting from a suicide
attempt after the patient had been admitted to the hospital for a previous
suicide attempt.40 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that, since the
acts which the defense claimed should be considered contributory fault
were the very acts which were symptoms of the illness for which
defendants were providing treatment, contributory fault was not available
as a defense. 41
In Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc.,42 after a patient who was
placed in a private hospital committed suicide, the administratrix of his
estate brought a wrongful death action. 43 The trial court found that the
negligence of the hospital and doctors was not the proximate cause of
the suicide victim's death, as a matter of law, due to the suicide victim's
36. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990). In Tomfohr, the suicide victim voluntarily admitted himself to
the Mayo Clinic suffering from severe depression. Tomfohr v. Mayo Found.. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn.
1990). He was put in a locked psychiatric ward, and placed on a suicide prevention program but was
able to hang himself in his room regardless. Id. at 122.
37. Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121,125 (Minn. 1990).
38. Id. at 123. The use of a "capacity-based" standard mandates the mentally disturbed patient's
conduct be measured by considering the extent of the patient's mental capacity. See, e.g., Warner v.
Kiowa County Hosp. Auth., 551 P.2d 1179, 1191 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that in order for a
defendant hospital to show contributory negligence, it has to preliminarily prove that the injured
plaintiff had the physical and mental capacity to use the level of care a normal person would for his
own protection). Mental capacity, courts have ruled, should hinge on whether a person is capable by
reason of mentality, intelligence, experience, training, discretion, and alertness of exercising care in a
given situation. Swindell v. Hellkamp, 232 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
39. 545 A.2d 159 (NJ. 1988).
40. Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 161 (NJ. 1988). Unhappy over her troubled marriage and
affair with the defendant. Dr. Richard Doering, Marilyn Cowan took an overdose of sleeping pills
prescribed for her by the defendant. Id. She telephoned the defendant who, alarmed by her slurred
speech, called an ambulance which took Ms. Cowan to the hospital. Id. Later that evening, Ms.
Cowan jumped 12 feet from the window in her hospital room, sustaining permanent injuries to her
back. Id. "These injuries were the basis for her damages claim against the defendant." Id.
41. Id. at 167. The court in Cowan also discussed that a defendant's duty of care may encompass
a plaintiffs failure to exercise appropriate self-care and therefore negate the defense of contributory
negligence. Id. But see Paddock v. Chacko, 522 So.2d 410, 417 (Fla. 1988) (stating that the
healthcare provider has no duty or power to take a patient into custody, particularly when the patient is
in the custody of a responsible relative).
42. 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), affd, 382 S.E.2d 597 (1989).
43. Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) affd. 382 S.E.2d 597
(1989). In Brandvain, the decedent, Walter Brandvain, was admitted to Ridgeview Institute, a hospital
specializing in the treatment of alcohol and drug abuse, because of cocaine, opiate and marijuana
addiction. Id. at 268. Brandvain attempted suicide by hanging himself with a sweater, was put on a
suicide watch, yet managed to hang himself with a shirt. Id. at 269.
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intervening violitional act of suicide. 44 However, the Georgia Appellate
Court reversed the lower court's decision in favor of the defendant
doctors on the grounds that a verdict in favor of the doctors would imply
that physicians can never be held responsible for a patient's suicide
regardless of its foreseeability. 45 The court reasoned that if that is to be
the policy of the state, it must be decided by the legislature.
46
Finally, in looking at comparative fault precedents of other states, in
1992, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Hickey v. Zezulka,47 that
comparison of fault between a suicide victim and a defendant, who has a
duty of medical care toward that victim, is generally for the trier of
fact.4 8 Although the comparative fault of a suicide victim is an issue of
first impression to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the concept of
comparative negligence has previously been addressed by that court. In
Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck,4 9 the North Dakota Supreme Court,
comparing the negligence of all the parties involved, found for the
plaintiff in a wrongful death action brought by the father of an inmate
who had committed suicide.5 0 The court found the suicide to be
foreseeable and the city negligent in failing to provide proper
supervision of the inmate. 51
After 1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court was required to take
those principles utilized in analyzing comparative negligence cases and
apply them to the new comparative fault analysis. One result of this
1987 transition from comparative negligence to comparative fault in
North Dakota was clear. The move served to place a greater burden on a
claimant since the claimant must now show that not only was he or she
44. Id. at 273.
45. Id. at 275. Furthermore, the court determined that patients may be so mentally ill that they
are not held to exercise any degree of care for themselves and cannot be contributorily negligent, thus
placing the fault squarely on the doctor who should have recognized their lack of mental capacity. Id.
at 274.
46. Id. at 275.
47. 487 N.W.2d 106, 123-24 (Mich. 1992). In Hickey, a father sued for wrongful death of his
son who committed suicide while in the custody of university officials after being placed under arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
48. Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 123 (Mich. 1992). In a divided opinion, the majority of
the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on
comparative fault. Id.
49. 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1987). On February 21, 1975, Kevin Falkenstein was involved in a
car accident on Main Avenue in Bismarck. Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 789
(N.D. 1987). He was arrested for driving while intoxicated and placed in the Bismarck jail because
he could not post bond. Id. Because he "foul-mouthed" a police officer, he was placed in "the hole,"
which is a small cell containing only a toilet bowl and two small grates for lights. Id. At 9 o'clock the
next morning, Kevin was found dead, after hanging himself with his t-shirt. Id.
50. Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1987).
51. Id. The supreme court decided Falkenstein just prior to the legislative change from compar-
ative negligence to comparative fault. Therefore, the willful conduct of Kevin Falkenstein in commit-
ting suicide was not an issue. See supra note 29 (stating that willful conduct is one component which
may be used in imputing comparative fault).
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less negligent than the person against whom he or she is seeking
recovery, but he or she must also demonstrate that his or her willful
conduct does not require the bearing of a greater share of fault than the
person against whom he or she is seeking recovery.
III. ANALYSIS
In Champagne v. United States,52 the North Dakota Supreme Court
had before it two issues: (1) should Ricky's act of suicide be considered
in terms of comparative fault in a case alleging a negligent failure to
prevent the suicide, and (2) should the fault of the suicide victim be
attributed to the survivors, Ricky's parents.53
A. COMPARISON OF THE SUICIDE VICTIM'S FAULT WITH THAT OF THE
MEDICAL CARE PROVIDER
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that if a suicidal patient is
incapable of being responsible for his or her own care and the medical
provider has undertaken a duty to care for the patient's well-being, there
is no allocation of fault to the patient.54 However, the Court explained
that if the patient is capable of being responsible for his or her own care,
allocation of fault between both patient and provider is in order.55 In
making these rulings, the court relied heavily on a similar 1990 Min-
nesota case, Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation.56
In Tomfohr, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted a state
"fault" statute 57 comparable to North Dakota's, which defined fault as
including "acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of others." 58 The Minnesota court
concluded that the fault of a patient suicide victim, who "lacked the capa-
52. 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994).
53. Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (N.D. 1994).
54. Id. at 80. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the duty medical providers
owe to a patient).
55. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 80.
56. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
Tomfohr v. Mayo Found. case, which involved a patient in a psychiatric ward who committed suicide
by hanging himself).
57. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Section 604.01(l)(a) defines
fault as "includ[ing] acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person
or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability." Id. The term also
includes "unreasonable failure to avoid an.injury." Id.
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). North Dakota's fault statute
also defines fault as "acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless towards the
person or property of others." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (Supp. 1995). However, North
Dakota's contributory fault statute uses the words "willful conduct" instead of Minnesota's
"unreasonable failure to avoid an injury." See supra note 29 (containing the relevant text of North
Dakota's comparative fault statute).
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city to be responsible for his own well-being" should not be compared
with the fault of the hospital that was caring for him when he committed
suicide. 59
The North Dakota Supreme Court characterized the Tomfohr hold-
ing by stating, "[ilf the patient's capacity for self care is so diminished
by mental illness that it is lacking, we agree that an allocation of fault is
not appropriate." 60 Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that the patient's capacity for self-care must be determined in
order to make a proper comparison of fault.
6 1
The supreme court did not determine the extent of Ricky's mental
capacity or his capacity for self-care. 62 Nor did the supreme court ad-
dress the lack of fact-finding conducted by the federal district court con-
cerning Ricky's capacity for self-care. 63  It only stated that the district
court made no specific findings on whether Ricky should have been kept
in the custody of IHS, or whether he was so incapacitated in handling his
own affairs that his care was within IHS's duty to provide.
64
Although the federal district court made no specific findings of fact
concerning Ricky's capacity, 65 it decided that because Ricky had the
intent to kill himself, the greatest fault must lie with him. 66 The federal
59. Tomfohr,450 N.W.2d at 121.
60. Champagne v. United States. 513 N.W.2d 75, 80 (N.D. 1994).
61. Id. The supreme court, however, rejected the Champagne's argument that, when a patient's
act of suicide is a reasonably foreseeable result of a medical provider's failure to prevent the suicide,
"it is never appropriate to compare the victim's act of suicide with the medical provider's fault." Id.
(emphasis added). According to the supreme court, even when medical providers take on a duty to
care for patients with diminished capacities, patients can only escape the allocation of a share of the
fault for a suicide if there is a showing that the patient is completely incapable of being responsible for
his own care. Id. See also Miller v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 260 N.W.2d 4, 6 (N.D. 1977) (stating that
recent cases have supported the proposition that a diminished capacity short of total insanity can be
considered in determining a plaintiff's degree of care for his own safety); Schweitzer v. Anderson, 83
N.W.2d 416, 420 (N.D. 1957) (stating that a six-year-old child can only be held to the degree of care
exercised by reasonable children of his age and experience); Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tel. Co., 135
N.W. 793, 796 (N.D. 1912) (stating that a child three-and-a-half-years-old can't be charged with
contributory negligence).
62. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 80. Although the federal district court did not discuss the extent
that Ricky's mental capacity was diminished, its findings imply that Ricky retained enough mental
capacity to be responsible for his own well-being (emphasis added). Champagne v. United States, 836
F. Supp. 684,690 (D.N.D. 1992) (concluding that "in the final analysis it was Ricky who chose to take
his own life and who must bear the ultimate responsibility for his own death"). In such circumstances,
section 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code directs comparison of the victim's fault with the
negligent care he received from the medical care defendant. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 80-81; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995).
63. Champagne. 513 N.W.2d at 80-81.
64. Id.
65. Id. See also Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 689 (noting that due to the negligence of IHS, there
is little evidence of Ricky's mental state).
66. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 690. However. the federal district court's apportionment of the
greatest amount of fault to Ricky is inconsistent with IHS's suicide prevention policy which statedly
accepts responsibility for treating suicide attempters. Appellants' Supreme Court Brief, supra note 3,
at 22. Specifically, IHS's written suicide protocol recognizes its duty to suicide attempters by stating
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district court placed great emphasis on Ricky's suicide note in deter-
mining his state of mind prior to his suicide. 67 In doing so, the federal
court reasoned that "at the least, the note indicates that Ricky's death
was a planned and intentional act." 68 In other words, the federal district
court equated intent with the capacity for self-care. 69 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, in its analysis, recognized this as a mistake when it stated
that Ricky's capacity for self-care must be determined before any fault
can be attributed to him.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has long recognized a duty of
care in potentially harmful situations. 70 If it is likely that injury will re-
sult if due precautions are not taken, a responsibility rests on the hospital
to see that the necessary precautions are taken. 7 1 By finding IHS
negligent 72 in performing its duty to Ricky, but yet, not finding it liable
for Ricky's suicide, the federal district court appeared to ignore North
Dakota's established duty of care. 73
As a further component in their comparative fault analysis, the
North Dakota Supreme Court also examined whether Ricky's suicide
"[e]very person giving evidence of suicide ideation or suicidal behavior shall be offered appropriate
counseling and/or referral services." Brief for Appellants at 12. Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d
946 (8th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-3321NDF) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].
67. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 689-90. Ricky's suicide note says in part: "I'm really sorry I
have to leave like this, but I think it is best for me. It may not seem like I have problems but I do, it's
so hard to talk about. Everything seems like it's coming so fast and I didn't know what to do." Id. at
689.
68. Id. at 689-90.
69. See Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 372 S.E.2d 265, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 382
S.E.2d 597 (1989) (stating that even though the act of suicide may be intentional in that the person ends
his own life, this does not excuse the doctor or hospital from taking reasonable steps to prevent the
suicide). See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.w.2d 579, 583 (N.D. 1979) (stating that a prima facie case
of medical malpractice must consist of evidence establishing the applicable standard of care, violation
of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of);
Benedict v. St. Luke's Hosp., 365 N.W.2d 499, 502 (N.D. 1985) (agreeing that the duty of care for a
medical specialist is the care and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by, and reasonably expected
of. other specialists engaged in similar practice).
71. See Miller v.,Trinity Med. Ctr., 260 N.W.2d 4, 6 (N.D. 1977) (stating that a hospital is
required to exercise such care as the hospital knew, or should have known, the patient's mental and
physical condition reasonably required). Von Eye v. Hammes, 147 F. Supp. 174, 182 (D. Minn. 1956),
(stating that the duty of care imposed on a hospital extends to safeguarding the patient from dangers
resulting from mental incapacity.) The fact that the defendant could not have anticipated the injury
that did happen does not excuse him. Id.
72. Champagne v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D.N.D. 1992). IHS was negligent in
several ways: It failed to determine Ricky's reasons for suicide, what his thoughts were at the time,
and whether there was a family history of suicide: and it failed to provide a structured, follow-up
treatment plan. Id.
73. See supra notes 70 and 71. The Eighth Circuit recognized that the federal district court
applied the wrong standard in their deliberations by focusing on the hospital's malpractice rather than
on Ricky's ability to be responsible for his own well-being. Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946,
947 (8th Cir. 1994), However, the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court's failure to evaluate
the evidence in terms of the legal standard specified by the North Dakota Supreme Court did not
constitute plain error because it could not be said that the result would "almost surely" have been
different. Id. at 947-49.
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could be considered a superseding cause, thereby relieving IHS from all
liability stemming from IHS's negligent treatment of Ricky. 74 In doing
so, the supreme court reviewed past cases involving superseding causes. 75
In McLean v. Kirby,76 the North Dakota Supreme Court considered
whether the rape of a potential customer by a distributor-hired vacuum
cleaner salesman was a superseding or intervening cause of the cus-
tomer's injuries, precluding liability by the manufacturer of the
vacuum. 77 The court ruled that the salesman's rape of the customer was
not a legally sufficient intervening cause serving to relieve the vacuum
manufacturer from liability. 78 Instead, the court found the manufacturer
negligent because it did not properly supervise its distributors, and did
not attempt to reduce the known dangers imposed by a salesman
entering a woman's home, solely on the basis of his "status" as a Kirby
dealer.79
The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed superseding cause
in First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop.8O In Scheels,
74. KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 44, at 311. In considering suicide as an intervening cause
between a defendant's negligence and a victim's subsequent suicide, it is a commonly held view that if
one is unable to realize the nature of his act or control it because of insanity, then the suicide is a
direct result of the defendant's negligence and not an intervening act and the defendant shall be liable.
Id. at 310-11. However, if the victim commits suicide during a "lucid interval," or is considered sane,
then the voluntary choice of suicide is labeled an intervening act, shielding the defendant from
liability. Id. at 311.
75. Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 81 (N.D. 1994). One case that the North
Dakota Supreme Court reviewed was Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., I I Cal.Rptr.2d 468
(Cal. App. 2d 1992). Id. In Jacoves, the parents of a 20-year-old man brought a wrongful death
claim against a hospital and a gun shop after their son committed suicide with a rifle he purchased
from the gun shop following his discharge from a psychiatric hospital. Jacoves v. United
Merchandising Corp., 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (Cal. App. 2d 1992). The court ruled that when a patient's
suicide is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent care of a health care provider, the act of suicide
cannot be deemed a superseding or intervening cause. Id. at 482-83. See also Cockrum v. State, 843
S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (involving the suicide of a prison inmate). According to the court in
Cockrum, if an intervening act is itself the foreseeable injury that initiates the custodian's duty, the
custodian who fails to prevent the act will not be excused from liability simply because that act
occurred. Id. at 437. Therefore, "self-destructive acts should not always be viewed as independent,
intervening acts that relieve the original negligent actors from liability." Id. See also Haumersen v.
Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1977) (stating that in order for an intervening act to relieve a
negligent individual from liability, it must not have been reasonably foreseeable); Shipman v. Fontaine,
459 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that an intervening act will not sever the connection
between a defendant's negligence and a plaintiffs injury if such intervening act was reasonably
foreseeable); Hille v. Wright County, 400 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that an event
must not be reasonably foreseeable in order to be superseding cause of injury); Delaware, By and
Through Delaware v. Valls, 409 N.W.2d 621 (Neb. 1987) (stating that the intervening act only cuts off
a tortfeasor's liability when the intervening act is not foreseeable); Ruff v. Burger, 145 N.W.2d 73
(Wis. 1966) (stating that if an intervening cause is one which is to be reasonably anticipated under the
circumstances or one which the defendant had reason to anticipate under the circumstances, he may
be negligent for failing to guard against it).
76. 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992).
77. McLean v. Kirby, 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992).
78. Id. at 242.
79. Id. at 243.
80. 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988). In Scheel's Hardware, a 14-year-old plaintiff, his mother, and
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much like in Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp.,81 the court
determined that if the tortfeasor creates a situation in which the interven-
ing negligence of another is a foreseeable consequence, that negligence
cannot be termed an intervening cause, thereby relieving the tortfeasor
of liability. 82
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Champagne agreed with the
reasoning in Scheels and Jacoves, stating that "[i]f Ricky's act of sui-
cide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of IHS's failure to pro-
vide reasonable medical care, then Ricky's suicide cannot be a supersed-
ing cause that entirely absolves IHS from responsibility by breaking the
legal chain of causation." 83 However, the supreme court did not make a
determination of whether Ricky's act of suicide was foreseeable, thus
constituting an intervening cause. 84 Instead, that issue was left to be
decided by the Eighth Circuit Court on rehearing, based on the Eighth
the conservator of his estate brought a negligence action against a 15-year-old boy who accidentally
shot the plaintiff at the hardware store that sold him the gun. Id. at 5. The court held that the
plaintiff's mother could recover for loss of plaintiff s society and companionship. Id.
81. 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (Cal. App. 2d 1992). See supra note 75 (discussing the Jacoves case,
stating that where the a patient's suicide is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent care of a
health care provider, the act of suicide cannot be classified as an intervening or superseding cause).
82. First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.w.2d 5, 8 (N.D. 1988). See also
Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832, 837 (N.D. 1990) (stating that a defendant cannot be relieved
from liability for his negligence unless there is an intervening act which "severs the connection of
cause and effect between the negligent act and the injury").
83. Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 81 (N.D. 1994). An intervening [superseding]
cause is one which comes into effect after the negligence of the defendant. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 19, § 44, at 301. A defendant is usually only held liable if the intervening cause is foreseeable.
Id. at 302. However, in some cases, recovery has been allowed where the intervening cause is
considered "normal" to the situation which as been created by the actor. Id. at 303 n.9 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435, cmt. d (1984)).
84. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. The district court, meanwhile, did not even address
superseding or intervening cause in its examination of the case. Champagne v. United States, 836 F.
Supp. 684 (D.N.D. 1992). However, in order to find that kicky was at fault, the federal district court
may have impliedly determined that Ricky's suicide was an intervening cause, shielding IHS from
fault. Id. at 689. Such a result seems contrary to the district court's determination that with
appropriate IHS intervention, Ricky's suicide could "more likely than not" have been prevented. Id.
at 688. If IHS had performed according to accepted standards of care, Ricky's suicide could have
been prevented. Id. Therefore, without IHS's negligence in failing to realize Ricky's potential for
suicide, there would have been no contributory fault attributable to Ricky for his intentional act of
suicide, nor could Ricky's act of taking his own life be termed a superseding or intervening cause.
See Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., Comment, The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or Wrongfully
Deceased?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 479-80 (1991) (stating that "[d]ue to their foreseeability,
suicides should not intervene as a superseding cause between the defendant's negligence and the
victim's suicide").
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Circuit's determination of whether Ricky's suicide was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of IHS's failure to provide reasonable medical
care. 85
B. SECTION 32-03.2-02 OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
SERVES TO BAR RECOVERY BECAUSE RICKY BEARS THE LARGER
SHARE OF FAULT
The second certified question of law before the North Dakota Su-
preme Court in the Champagne case involved the imputation of fault to
the suicide victim's parents bringing a wrongful death action. 86
Prior to 1987 and the adoption of comparative fault, the contribu-
tory negligence of the deceased barred recovery87 by a survivor of the
decedent who sued for damages for wrongful death. 88 After the
adoption of comparative fault in 1987, a survivor was only allowed to
recover in a damages action if the wrongful act "would have entitled the
party injured, if death had not ensued, to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof." 89 The new comparative fault law provides
for the recovery of damages involving tort claims, pursuant to a
modified comparative fault system.90
In Champagne, the supreme court relied on the comparative fault
law and attributed Ricky's fault to the Champagnes, the wrongful death
plaintiffs.91 The court found the basis for its reasoning in section 32-21-
85. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. The Eighth Circuit determined that the federal district court
applied the wrong standard in evaluating the evidence in this case because they focused on whether
Ricky's suicide was foreseeable, rather than on whether Ricky had the ability to be responsible for his
own well-being. Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946,947 (8th Cir. 1994). However, this did not
constitute plain error and did not change the result reached by the federal district court. Id. See infra
notes 104-106 (discussing the Eighth Circuit's decision on rehearing).
86. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81.
87. Schlinsog, supra note 84, at 471 ("allowing the decedent or his heirs to recover on a wrongful
death claim would violate the public policy notion that an individual responsible for his own injury
should not recover against a third party"). (footnote omitted).
88. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. See Krise v. Gillund. 184 N.W.2d 405, 409 (N.D. 1971)
(holding that the contributory negligence of the deceased in a car collision barred recovery for the
plaintiff, the decedent's surviving wife).
89. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. The North Dakota statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the
act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party injured, if death had not
ensued, to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every
such case the person who, or the corporation, limited liability company, or company
which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured or of the tortfeasor...
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995). See supra note 29 (stating that contributory
fault does not bar recovery unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all the persons who
contributed to the injury). See also supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing modified
comparative fault).
91. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. KEETON ET AL.. supra note 19, § 127, at 955.
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01 of the North Dakota Century Code.92 Although the Champagnes ar-
gued that recovery should be reduced only in proportion to the fault at-
tributable to the person recovering, 93 the court rejected the Champagne's
contentions and maintained that this statute is unambiguous, and coupled
with section 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, the dece-
dent's fault is "attributable" to the Champagne parents and damages
must therefore be diminished in proportion to the contributing fault of
both the parents and the decedent. 94
The federal district court's denial of recovery to the Champagnes
lies in the assumption that the Champagnes, Ricky and his parents, were
mostly at fault for Ricky's suicide. Such a conclusion, however, chal-
lenges past precedent in North Dakota concerning the link between
recovery and foreseeability by the defendant. 95 If a defendant is on
"The wrongful death action for the benefit of survivors is, like other actions based on
injuries to others, derivative in nature, arising out of and dependent upon the wrong done
to the injured person and thus barred when his claim would be barred."
Id. (footnote omitted).
92. See supra note 89 (stating that a cause of action for damages lies against the individual who
by his negligence caused the death of another person, if the deceased individual would have had a
cause of action had he not died). See also KEETON, ET AL., supra note 19, § 127, at 955 (stating that
under comparative negligence statutes, the decedent's contributory fault will have the same effect in a
death action as it would in a personal injury action, which is normally a reduction in damages). See
also Anderson v. Gailey, 555 P.2d 144, 154 (Idaho 1976) (stating that "plaintiff's negligence
contributing to his injury ... remains a bar whenever his negligence is as great or greater than that of
the defendant's"). In Anderson, parents brought a wrongful death action for their son who was killed
after being lowered into a 285 foot deep shaft to recover a drill bit for the defendant. Id. at 147. The
court determined that in comparing the negligence of the defendant and the deceased, the deceased
would have been barred from recovery of damages if his negligence was equal to or greater than the
defendant's. Id. at 154. The Anderson court stated that the deceased's negligence would similarly
bar his parents from recovery in their wrongful death action. Id.
93. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81.
94. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81-82. The supreme court's conclusion is consistent with the fed-
eral district court's finding. Champagne v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D.N.D. 1992).
Although the federal district court labeled IHS as negligent and that negligence as a proximate cause
of Ricky's death, it ruled that the plaintiffs were barred from recovery since Ricky was the primary
proximate cause of his own death, and Ricky's fault combined with his parents' fault exceeded the
government's fault. Id. at 689-90.
95. See Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 791 (N.D. 1978) (establishing that the
controlling factor in the decision of whether to allow recovery for failure to prevent a suicide is
whether the defendants "reasonably should have anticipated the danger that the deceased would
attempt to harm himself") (citing Fernandez v. Barach, 244 A.2d 109, 112 (NJ. 1968)). Reasonably
therefore, the concept of the defendant's lack of foreseeability would be the same in either a
negligence-based or a fault-based context; the plaintiff's negligence or fault would not change the
duty placed on the defendant to anticipate future harm. In Champagne, one of the plaintiffs experts
who testified at trial stated that, "Ricky clearly had demonstrated, I think, what society would describe
as bad judgment by attempting suicide and now giving him the authority to make good judgment seems
to be hopeful at best." Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 688. See also supra note 75 (providing a general
discussion of responsibility and foreseeability).
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notice that the individual has attempted suicide in the past, there is an
even higher obligation to exercise care in preventing the suicide.96 IHS
and its staff had assumed such a duty of care toward Ricky, and were
aware that Ricky might harm himself. Not only had he attempted
suicide once before, but his mother had told Mr. Azure specifically that
Ricky was giving away prized possessions. 97 Falkenstein establishes a
clear cut rule-recovery based on the defendant's failure to reasonably
anticipate a suicide after being put on notice that such an event might
occur. 98 In Champagne, IHS and its staff did have notice that Ricky
might try to harm himself-the district court found IHS negligent in
failing to anticipate Ricky's suicide. 99 As such, Falkenstein should be
adhered to in this case, and IHS should be held accountable for its
failure to anticipate, and prevent, Ricky's suicide. Furthermore, the
Falkenstein ruling is consistent with section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts which states:
[o]ne who undertakes . . . to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm.100
Accordingly, if IHS had performed in accordance with accepted
standards of care, Ricky's suicide could have been prevented.101 IHS
took on Ricky's duty of care, inducing the Champagnes to rely on
IHS's services and expertise which would be provided to Ricky. Because
96. See Falkenstein, 268 N.W.2d at 792 (stating that the duty of care depends upon the
circumstances). See also Williams v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1306, 1313
(W.D. Tenn. 1992) (ruling that the defendants may have breached the accepted standard of care by
releasing the plaintiff after a suicide attempt and for failing to properly treat the plaintiff on her first
visit).
97. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 77. Although actions in negligence for failure to prevent a
suicide are generally not enforceable because the deliberate act of the decedent limits the liability of
the defendant, an exception exists when there is a duty to prevent the suicide, as when someone who is
obligated for custodial care of the eventual decedent, is in a position to know about their suicidal
potential, and does not act timely in providing preventive measures. Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277,
278 (Mont. 1989).
98. Falkenstein, 268 N.W.2d at 791. See also Home v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342. 344 (S.C. 1985)
(stating that recovery in a suicide action is allowable if the damages -are shown to be proximately
caused by the individual who breached the duty by failing to guard against the foreseeable injury).
99. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 688.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1984).
101. See supra note 20 (stating that accepted standards of care require a detailed follow-up
plan). See also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE rN MINNESOTA (1987) at 102-03 (stating that a psychiatrist has a
duty to exercise reasonable care for his or her patient's care and safety, to the extent that the patient is
unable to do so personally). The Minnesota malpractice manual provides that the most critical
component in determining whether there is liability is whether the psychiatrist could have reasonably
foreseen that a patient might try to harm himself. Id.
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of that induced reliance, the Champagnes did not find it necessary to
look elsewhere for services designed to help Ricky, believing IHS was
providing the best care possible for him.102 Essentially then, IHS's
failure to exercise appropriate care in treating Ricky precluded the
Champagnes from seeking alternative assistance for Ricky's mental
condition. Hence, IHS increased the risk that Ricky might commit
suicide by not providing adequate counseling,103 and instilling in his
parents a false sense of security in Ricky's safety.
IV. IMPACT
On rehearing of Champagne, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the ruling of the federal district court, barring the Champagnes
from recovery. 104 The Eighth Circuit stated that although the federal dis-
trict court did not evaluate the evidence in the case in light of the correct
legal standard, this failure did not constitute reversible error. 105 Ac-
cording to the Eighth Circuit, the correct legal standard was whether
Ricky could be responsible for his own well-being.106
The key issue in this case, as identified by the Eighth Circuit in its
ruling, was Ricky's capacity for self-care. A method of determining a
person's capacity for self-care is available via North Dakota's
involuntary treatment statute.107 The statutory definition section10 8
recognizes a "person requiring treatment" as a mentally ill person who
poses a serious risk of self harm. 109 Ability to reason or act intentionally
102. Champagne, 836 F. Supp. at 688.
103. See id.
104. Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946,948 (8th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. The Eighth Circuit's task was to determine if the district court's ruling amounted to legal
error as neither the parties nor the district court had evaluated the information under the correct legal
standard, which was a determination of Ricky's capacity to care for himself. Id. at 947.
106. Id. at 948. The Eighth Circuit determined that the district court's failure to use the proper
legal standard in evaluating this case did not constitute reversible error, because the result would
"almost surely" have been the same if the trial court had used the correct legal standard. Id. (citing
Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., I I F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Lusby v.
TG&Y Stores, Inc., 796 F2d 1307, 1312 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986)). However. the Eighth Circuit's lone
dissenter, Senior Circuit Judge Gibson, rejected the majority's holding recognizing that the district
court did not evaluate the record under the proper standard of Ricky's capacity to care for himself.
Id.
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-01 to -30 (1995) (concerning commitment procedures for the
mentally ill).
108. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(11) (1995). Subsection I I provides:
"Person requiring treatment" means a person who is mentally ill or chemically
dependent, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there
exists a serious risk of harm to that person, others, or property. "Serious risk of harm"
means a substantial likelihood of ... [sluicide, as manifested by suicidal threats, attempts,
or significant depression relevant to suicidal potential[.]
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(11) (1995).
109. Id. South Dakota's involuntary treatment statute contains similar language specifying that
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is not included in the statutory text. Therefore, "under North Dakota
law, a suicide victim's mental capacity for self-care must be specifically
determined before any comparative fault can be assigned to the
victim." 1 10 Accordingly, under the Eighth Circuit's rationale, the
federal district court's inadequate determination of Ricky's mental
capacity and his capacity for self-care as it relates to his "fault" renders
dubious that court's conclusion."'l
Under current suicide theories, "all persons who commit suicide do
so because they cannot appreciate the nature of their act."1 12 Scholars
on the subject of suicide theorize that all suicide victims "act under
pressure of unconscious forces.""l 3 Therefore, a person who commits
suicide because someone has failed to help him or her deal with these un-
conscious forces may not be at all responsible for his or her act.114
While it would not be a feasible rule to find all suicide victims with-
out fault, in instances of this type, where one party has assumed responsi-
bility for care of the other and was negligent in failing to uphold proper
standards of care, the provider could almost always be shielded from
"danger to self" requiring involuntary treatment includes behavior which promotes a reasonable
expectation that that person will "inflict serious harm upon himself in the very near future," including
a danger of suicide. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-!-1(5) (1987 & Supp. 1994).
110. Supplemental Brief, supra note 6, at 2; but see KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 32, at 178
(contending that there should be a shifting of comparative fault). Specifically, Prosser asserts that:
[T]he question shifts from which of two innocents should bear the loss to whether a
negligent defendant should pay for the loss he has partially caused to a mentally
incapacitated person incapable of properly looking after himself. Because of the
obviously different equities in this situation, the great majority of the courts in the
contributory negligence context apply a lower standard of care and consider the
plaintiff's incapacity as only one of the "circumstances" to be considered in judging the
quality of his conduct.
Id. Such distinctions permit the trier of fact to determine if the plaintiff's mental condition deprived
him of the ability to perceive or avoid the harm. Id. at n.39.
Prosser's principle concerning the shifting of comparative fault is applicable in this case.
Under Prosser's standard, because IHS was negligent, it would be apportioned the larger share of
fault, rather than having its fault equally apportioned with Ricky's. In addition, Prosser's analysis adds
credence to the notion that this case should be remanded to determine if Ricky's mental condition
deprived him of the ability to avoid harm. Compare id. (contending there should be a shifting of
comparative fault) with Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for remand for analysis of Ricky's capacity based on North Dakota's
comparative fault scheme).
111. An appellate court may overturn the findings of a trial court if it finds that the trial court was
clearly erroneous. LaRoche v. United States, 779 F.2d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985).
112. Schlinsog, supra note 84, at 477.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. at 478-79. Dr. Blain described Ricky as being very depressed the day before his dis-
charge. Brief for Appellants, supra note 66, at 9. It is unlikely that this kind of depression will go
away within the 48 hours Ricky was hospitalized at IHS. Id. IHS diagnosed, retrospectively, that
Ricky was suffering from adjustment disorder. Id. Accepted standards of care for treating that
disorder require intervention in the form of counseling. Id. However, Ricky never received that
counseling. Id.
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liability.115 A more equitable situation involves apportioning greater
fault to the party who assumed responsibility and failed."l 6 When the de-
fendant has assumed a duty of care, it is logical that that duty encom-
passes the decedent's duty to avoid self-damaging acts.117
If North Dakota courts opt to maintain the status quo-that those
committing suicide be judged on a strict fault-based percentage-many
survivors will not be compensated for a loss that can be causally traced to
the negligence of a third party. Such a phenomenon would inescapably
excuse from liability those who fail to uphold proper standards of
care.i 18
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115. See Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 812-13 (Minn. 1981) (stating that under
comparative fault, "the legislative body that enacted the comparative fault statute has the authority to
carve out or preserve exceptions to the statute in the interest of public policy").
116. Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 167 (NJ. 1988) (holding that doctors' and nurses' duty of
care for a mentally disturbed patient encompasses the patient's failure to exercise self-care so that a
defense of contributory negligence is not available).
"Because the improper application of contributory negligence can prevent any recovery
for tortuous injury and enable a tortfeasor to escape liability, it can indirectly lessen
responsibility for wrongful conduct and defeat the goals of tort law."
Id. at 167.
117. Id. at 166.
"[Blecause the defendant's duty of care was co-extensive with the plaintiff's ability to
avoid self-dimaging acts, the withdrawal of contributory or comparative negligence
supports the policy which undergirds our 'fault-based' system of tort law, particularly
that the discouragement of unreasonable conduct, is not undermined."
Id. at 166-67.
118. REsTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF TORTS § 449, cmt. b (1984). Under Prosser's theory, if one party
owes a duty to protect another from harm, and injury occurs because of a failure to protect, recovery
to the individual injured cannot be denied, regardless of the injured individual's actions: to do so would
make the duty of the first individual a nullity. Id.

